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I. Introduction
The Food Subsidy Programme (Programa Subsidio de Alimentos, PSA) is the main basic
social protection programme of the government of Mozambique in terms
of coverage. It was established in 1990 to help the destitute elderly
(women above 55 and men above 60), people living with a disability,
the chronically sick and their dependants by providing a monthly
cash transfer. The programme falls under the mandate of
the Ministry for Women and Social Action (MMAS), while
implementation is the responsibility of the National Institute
for Social Action (INAS), the Ministry’s executing agency.
By the end of 2008, the PSA covered 143,455 households with
a total of 287,454 beneficiaries. The main direct beneficiaries
were the elderly (93 per cent), followed by people living
with disabilities (6 per cent) and the chronically ill
(1 per cent). The general eligibility criteria are: age,
residency for more than six months in the selected area,
per capita earnings less than the minimum benefit on the PSA scale, and/or recognised by medical declaration to be chronically
ill or living with a disability. Potential beneficiaries are selected by a local intermediary (known as a Permanente) chosen by the
community and appointed by INAS, after which the application undergoes an approval process within the INAS delegation.
Although the PSA is a national programme, it does not reach the entire eligible population and its coverage is unequally
distributed across districts. This is the result of the absence of an expansion strategy based on poverty incidence and population
density. Expansion of the PSA was initially restricted to urban areas in order to mitigate the effects of the post-war structural
adjustment programme on the urban population (Low et al., 1999). Currently, expansion to remote rural areas is a programme
priority. The programme’s administrative cost is considered high relative to the amount transferred to the beneficiaries
(Ellis, 2007). Though the programme is the largest in terms of the number of beneficiaries, its coverage is low relative to the
potential universe of beneficiaries. Expansion of the programme tends to diminish the administrative costs in relative terms.
In 2008, the PSA underwent two important reforms. First, the subsidy scale increased. The subsidy amount for the first (direct)
beneficiaries rose from 70 to 100 meticais (US$2.5 to US$3.6), and the additional benefit for dependants increased from 10 to 50
meticais (US$0.36 to US$1.80) per dependant up to four. The second reform was the greater focus on the inclusion of eligible
dependants as indirect beneficiaries in the payment scheme, and the monitoring and evaluation system.
Though it is a relatively old programme, it has never been evaluated before. An opportunity to conduct an evaluation has arisen
in the context of the reforms. This Policy Research Brief seeks to improve knowledge of the PSA by presenting the first part of the
PSA impact evaluation—that is, the summary of the baseline report.
II. Objectives of the Evaluation
The objective of the evaluation is to analyse the impact of the PSA on individual beneficiaries and families, so as to inform the
technical and political dialogue with government and partners on the PSA’s direction. It is anticipated that the empirical evidence
generated by the evaluation will influence key programme decisions such as the amounts and range of the benefit scale,
number of beneficiaries, composition of the target group, and so on. The baseline survey to which this Brief refers is the first
stage of gathering important empirical evidence to nourish the debate on social protection in Mozambique.
III. Methodology and Data
The evaluation will assess the impact on a sample of new beneficiaries who were included in the programme in 2008, according
to the INAS expansion plan. For the new beneficiary households, the programme’s impact on a particular outcome is the
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difference between the observed value of that outcome for
new beneficiaries and the value of the same outcome for the
same beneficiary households if they had not received the
benefit. The latter is called the counterfactual. Since it is
impossible to observe the same household as a beneficiary
and non-beneficiary of the programme at the same time, it is
not enough to have data only on the beneficiaries; we have
to use a control group to simulate the counterfactual.
Social experiments based on randomisation (randomised
control trials) of the programme among beneficiaries or of the
localities in which the programme is going to be implemented
guarantee that both the treated (beneficiaries) and control
(non-beneficiaries) groups are, on average, identical in both
observed and non-observed dimensions. In such a context
any difference between the treated and control groups
after a certain time of exposition can be attributed to the
programme. This is not the actual context of this evaluation.
The expansion of the programme was not randomised across
districts or localities; thus we have to rely on quasi-experimental
techniques to make the control group resemble the treated
group in order to build the counterfactual. In particular, we will
use the probability of being treated (the propensity score) to
reweight the control observations. The applied methodology
also entails following the treatment and control groups for a
period and comparing outcomes between the two—that is,
the differences-in-differences (DD) approach. The weighted
difference in indicators between baseline and follow-up is
calculated for each group (beneficiary and non-beneficiary); the
difference in these two differences is calculated to obtain the
estimate of programme impact (Hirano et al., 2003; Abadie, 2005).
The evaluation will use quantitative data from 11 districts
in seven provinces. The first phase was the baseline survey in
2008, to which this Brief refers. The second phase, the follow-
up, will be carried out in 2009. The same questionnaire will
be applied in both surveys to the same households.
For the treatment group, a total of 1,016 households
participated in the survey; there were 1,650 households in
the control group. The treatment group was selected on the
basis of an INAS list of new candidates. The baseline did not
include households in villages where the programme was
already operating before the baseline, so as to prevent
“contamination” of the sample. The control group was
supposed to comprise the remaining potential beneficiaries
in the same communities (but who would not receive the
PSA until 2010). As this group was too small to yield a
feasible control group, neighbouring communities were
included in the sample and the INAS Permanente selected
the control group on the basis of the INAS eligibility criteria.
It is important to note that the external validity of this
evaluation is limited, since our treated sample comes from
districts that have been selected to be part of the survey
rather than the programme. Similarly, the control group is
not representative of the eligible population in the villages
where the programme has not yet started, nor of all eligible
beneficiaries in Mozambique.
Although the PSA seeks mainly to attenuate the livelihood
or subsistence difficulties of people who are permanently
unable to work, the evaluation includes some indicators of
the impact on livelihood, livestock and farming activities.
The impact evaluation covers a range of indicators related
to consumption, health, education, employment, housing,
and intra-household demographic changes. Indicators were
developed on the basis of international evidence of the
impact of cash transfers, in combination with the need for
evidence to feed the local political and policy discussion.
Nonetheless, estimates of the impact of the programme
will be available only after analysis of the follow-up survey.
IV. Limitations
One of the limitations of applying the questionnaire to the
treatment group is that their PSA application had already
been approved before the survey. Although they should
not yet have received the benefit at the time of the survey,
they were aware that they would receive it soon afterwards.
Hence there is a possibility that anticipation of its arrival
may have led to an initial change of behaviour at the
household level.
Additionally, the results of the baseline survey revealed
that about 25 per cent of the treatment group sample
(257 households from a total of 1,016) were already
receiving the benefit (Figure 1). Nevertheless, 64 per cent of
these beneficiaries had been receiving the benefit for only
a month or less, and 97 per cent for less
than three months, which lessens concerns
about a possible bias. The households
that had already received the benefit
are concentrated in the districts of Manica
(south), Massinga (centre) and Nacala (north).
In Manica, the contamination level reached
94 per cent of the sample (Figure 1).
V. Characteristics of the
Treatment Group
The households in the treatment group
have an average of three members in each
family. Table 1 shows that about 60 per cent
of the heads of household are women, and
68 per cent of these are widows.
Source: Baseline Survey, 2008.
Figure 1
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Among the male heads of household, only 15 per cent are
widowers. The average age of the head of household is 66,
the women being slightly younger than the men, a fact that
is in line with the programme’s eligibility criterion.
About 50 per cent of the households do not have children
under 18 years of age. Children account for about 37 per
cent of the dependants living in the selected households
and 8 per cent of the households have more than three
children. This picture indicates that, in terms of the sample
of the treatment group, there are not many children
that potentially could receive an entitlement as indirect
beneficiaries. This is aggravated by the fact that, according
to the PSA eligibility criteria, children who are not orphans
are not entitled to a benefit. Of the households with
children, only 21 per cent of those children are potentially
eligible on the basis of their orphanhood.
Of those under the age of 18, some 63 per cent are
grandchildren of the head of household and 30 per cent are
children of the head. About 21 per cent of the children are
orphans, and 28 per cent of this group have lost both their
father and mother. Among the grandchildren, 24 per cent
are orphans and 39 per cent of them have lost both parents.
Some 65 per cent of children have a father and a mother but
at least one of the parents does not live in the same house.
Particularly, for the grandchildren, this number is even
higher than 90 per cent.
VI. Major Differences between the
Treatment and Control Groups
The comparison between the treatment and control
groups reveals existing differences before the roll-out
of the programme (Table 1). These should be considered
in the impact evaluation, at the time of the analysis of
the follow-up survey.
Overall, in the control group, the size of the household
is smaller: an average of 2.3 members, against 3.1 in the
treatment group. Of the treatment group, 51 per cent do
not have children in the household, while in the control
group 67 per cent of the households do not have children.
Additionally, 8 per cent of the treatment group have more
than three children while only 3 per cent of the control
group have more than three children in the household.
Data on orphanhood do not differ significantly between
the treatment and control groups.
VII. Preliminary Findings on the PSA Benefit
Since a number of households in the treatment group had
already received one monthly cash transfer, it is possible
to analyse certain aspects of the implementation of the
programme on the basis of the baseline data. The average
amount of the benefit received by the households is 149
meticais (US$5.38). About 50 per cent of the households
received the minimum amount of 100 meticais and 30 per
cent received 200 meticais. Among those that received the
minimum, 35 per cent had at least one child younger than
18 years; that child represents a potential indirect beneficiary
who was not receiving their entitlement. This indicates that
for a third of the beneficiaries, some children were not
counted in the calculation of the total amount of the
benefit, perhaps because the child has not lost his or her
parents, an eligibility criterion. Table 2 compares the
amount effectively received by the household with
the actual entitlement, according to the composition
of such a household.
Among households that reported having received 100
meticais, 42.5 per cent received the amount that they
were supposed to receive when they were classified as
beneficiaries, while 57.5 per cent received less than the
entitlement. The households that reported receiving 70
meticais, an amount below the minimum, should all receive
the maximum amount (300 meticais). Among the households
that reported receiving 400 meticais, 73.7 per cent should
have received less than the maximum.
Table 1
Demographic Characteristics of the Treatment
and Control Groups
Source: Baseline Survey, 2008.
  Treated Control  Total 
Size of household  
(mean number of people)  3.07 2.29 2.68 
Dependency rate  1.01  0.86  0.94 
Percentage of households  
without members aged 15–64  28.6 34.6 31.6 
Characteristics of head of 
household     
Percentage of men  39.3  40.8  40.1 
Age 65.6  68.7  67.2 
Age, women  65.1  68.0  66.6 
Age, men  66.4  69.6  68.1 
Number of children (%)     
Have children 0–17  49.1  32.8  40.9 
Have children 0–4  15.4  11.0  13.2 
Have children 5–14  41.1  24.9  32.9 
Have children 15–17  15.6  7.8  11.6 
Have more than 3 children 0–17   8.0  3.0  5.5 
Children 0–17 relationship  
with the head of household (%)     
Son/daughter 29.8  32.8  30.9 
Grandson/granddaughter 62.6  63.0  62.7 
Other 7.6  4.2  6.4 
Orphanhood (under 18 years) (%)          
Father and mother died  5.9  5.5  5.7 
Only father died  9.9  8.4  9.4 
Only mother died  5.1  3.9  4.7 
Neither died, but live elsewhere  51.9  55.0  53.0 
Table 2
Actual Entitlement of the Household and
Benefit Effectively Received
Source: Baseline Survey, 2008.
*Amounts reported by the respondent, but which do not correspond
to the amounts actually paid by the programme.
   Actual entitlement (meticais)   
Benefit effectively  
received (meticais)  100 150 200 250 300  Total 
70* 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  100.0  100.0% 
100  42.5  30.8 11.6  8.1  7.0  100.0% 
150 13.6  53.1  6.6 13.3 13.4  100.0% 
200 41.4  20.5  10.3  13.2 14.6  100.0% 
250 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  100.0% 
300 22.9  33.1  11.5  10.8  21.7  100.0% 
400* 0.0  23.2  0.0  50.5  26.3  100.0% 
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The current average amount of the benefit accounts
for 21.8 per cent of a household’s current consumption.
On the basis of international experience of cash transfers,
this may be considered a reasonable proportion of
monthly expenditure. However, on the basis of the
minimum monthly food basket as set by the Mozambican
government, these households fall significantly short
of their actual needs for a healthy and dignified lifestyle.
A large majority of the respondents also indicated
that the amount received is not enough to help
with household expenses.
VIII. Final Remarks
It is interesting to note that the simulations of the
expansion of the PSA reported by UNICEF (2007), on the
basis of data from the Household Survey (IAF) 2002–2003,
estimate that those below 18 years of age would account
for about 50 per cent of potential indirect beneficiaries,
while in the sample of the treatment group only 37 per
cent of minor dependants actually receive an entitlement.
The reasons for this divergence warrant further research,
but it may be related to the application process for the PSA
and the fact that a number of the children are not orphans
or do not have the appropriate identity documents.
Data on the amount received and the actual entitlement
suggest that a significant percentage of potential indirect
beneficiaries are not receiving their entitlement. Apart from
the fact that a number of families really might not be
receiving the correct amount, discrepancies could also stem
from the fact that the new beneficiaries of the treatment
group are still unfamiliar with their monthly entitlement or
report a higher number of dependants, with the hope that
this can bring higher benefits. Further analysis of the
application process and classification of the families is
needed to clarify this picture.
IX. Next Steps
As regards the baseline survey, the next steps are to
conduct additional analysis drawing on data from the
Household Budget Survey (IOF) and the Multiple Indicator
Cluster Survey (MICS) to investigate the targeting of the
programme. These surveys will be used to calculate an asset
index that will serve as a proxy for household well-being.
This will make it possible to assess whether the beneficiary
(treated) households are located in the lower echelon
of households when it comes to the distribution of assets.
As regards the evaluation, the next step will be a second
round of data collection by means of a follow-up survey
to be conducted in November 2009, through which
it will be possible to determine the short-term
(one-year) impact of the PSA.
Other research questions, which the evaluation will not
answer, need to be explored. Though it is beyond the scope of
this impact evaluation, it would be useful to conduct a census
among the beneficiaries in order to establish the extent to
which they are paid above or below their entitlement, and
subsequently to take steps to rectify matters. Finally, the
current baseline survey is a quantitative survey that in due
time will be complemented by a qualitative study exploring
the (cultural) reasons for certain quantitative results.
Independent of the results of the follow-up survey, a number
of issues has already been identified as possible subjects of
interest for the qualitative study. These issues include intra-
household relationships, dependency and social cohesion,
self-esteem/dignity, stigma, migration and child labour,
the supply side of public services, and linkages
between the PSA and other government programmes.
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